The Mars Science Laboratory project recently landed the Curiosity rover on the surface of Mars. With the success of the landing system, the performance envelope of entry, descent, and landing capabilities has been extended over the previous state of the art. This paper will present an overview of the MSL entry, descent, and landing system, a discussion of a subset of its development challenges, and include a discussion of preliminary results of the flight reconstruction effort.
Sky crane, or a different number of parachutes, or solid rocket motors as opposed to throttlable mono-propellant, etc.) That the over riding architecture survived, may be the result of some of the architecting and design practices deployed by the team. That said, in many instances, there were development challenges and struggles that resulted in changes to system elements (ex: heat shield thermal protection material selection) and additions in EDL complexity (ex: "dot-product trigger").
The object of this paper is to explore some of those development challenges and to give the reader insight into what was entailed in the development process for MSL. There is a brief section that attempts to describe the system margin practice used in the development of the MSL EDL architecture and give an example of how that may have protected the architecture during development. By design this is a narrative, and because of space constraints, a selected discussion of a subset of the challenges faced by the MSL EDL developers.
EDL OVERVIEW
The entry, descent, and landing process at Mars, or any other planet with an atmosphere, is a process of managed energy dissipation. The central challenge is to remove the kinetic energy of planetary arrival and prepare for a managed impact with the surface. At Mars, where the atmosphere is roughly about 1/100 th that of Earth's, maintaining altitude and sufficient timeline to prepare for the surface contact is paramount. The job of dissipating arrival energy and preparing for managed impact is spread throughout the different segments of EDL.
Final Approach
During the Final Approach segment, at the end of the eight and a half month cruise to Mars, preparations for entry, descent, and landing became the focus for the spacecraft and flight team. These preparations center upon three primary objectives: 1) get the spacecraft ready for EDL, 2) get the spacecraft to the right place to start EDL at the right time, and 3) tell the spacecraft what it needs to know to execute EDL successfully. These objectives result in activities such as hardware checkouts and parameter loads, trajectory correction maneuvers to put the vehicle on course for the targeted entry conditions, and navigated state updates to seed the entry system with accurate knowledge for use in guided entry. These activities require the cruise and EDL teams to work in concert to balance operational risks to the spacecraft in cruise with EDL risks associated with putting the vehicle in the best possible physical and software state to execute EDL successfully 1 .
Exoatmospheric Segment
The exoatmospheric segment of EDL spans the period from cruise stage separation through arrival at the entry interface point, 3522.2 km from the center of Mars. During this period, the vehicle completes its transition from cruise to EDL configuration with the separation of the cruise stage at Entry -10 minutes. At Entry-9 minutes, full EDL control of the spacecraft becomes active and the vehicle begins using reaction control thrusters to stop the residual spin rate from cruise and turn to the desire entry attitude. Two externally mounted tungsten masses, used to balance out the center of gravity during the spin stabilized cruise portion of the mission, are jettisoned, thus leaving the spacecraft with an offset center of gravity to generate lift during entry.
Entry 2
The entry segment of EDL spans approximately 4.5 minutes and begins at entry interface and ends at supersonic parachute deploy. At entry interface, the vehicle is traveling at approximately 5.8 km/s at a targeted flight path angle of -15.5°. At this point, the entry propulsion system transitions from blow-down pressurization to a higher regulated pressure to provide sufficient thrust for entry control and the later powered flight segment. 3 When the spacecraft senses drag acceleration of 0.2 Earth g's, entry guidance begins. Using the lift provided by the center of gravity offset, the guided entry system is able to correct for errors in initial delivery state, atmosphere conditions, and aerodynamic uncertainties while also significantly increasing altitude capability by modulating the direction of lift. If lower than anticipated atmospheric drag is encountered, either because of the rover has touched down, the descent stage continues downward until persistent reduced throttle settings have been confirmed using a 1.5 second rolling window. At that time, touchdown is declared and flyaway begins.
Flyaway
After touchdown is declared, descent stage motion is stopped and the bridles are cut free. Control is transferred to the Descent Stage. The Flyaway controller on the Descent Stage executes an attitude and throttle profiles to fly it on a preprogrammed trajectory to a distance of at least 150. This leaves the rover wheels down on the surface of Mars and ready to begin commissioning.
THERMAL PROTECTION SYSTEM MATERIAL
The initial plans for the MSL EDL system assumed the design would use SLA-561V for the thermal protection material on the forward facing heat shield. This material had been used on the Viking, Mars Pathfinder, Mars Exploration Rovers, and Phoenix missions with great success. The SLA material, like many lower density TPS materials, is a mixture of many component materials; cork, silicon, phenolic and a host of other materials make up the slurry that is cured on the heat shield and forms a protective coating with a slightly spongy texture and a density between that of cork and rubber.
MSL has a heat shield that is sufficiently large that the subsonic boundary layer, the source of a great fraction of the heating during entry, was thought to possibly be able to trip to turbulent flow prior to peak heating. This was a concern since turbulent boundary layers are more efficient at transferring heat to the TPS material. Turbulence would augment the previously anticipated heating rates. Further, turbulent heating augmentation is not well understood, for this application and there was substantial debate amongst the team as to what level of heating we should expect.
The previous missions were though to have experienced the following heating rates are shown in Table 1 . As development proceeded, three phenomena converged that eventually overran the plans to use SLA. First, the assumed heating environment grew as more and more concern was voiced regarding the possible heating that we might experience due to the fully turbulent boundary layer flow that was expected. Second, uncertainty as to how much heating augmentation would occur when considerations of roughness considered also drove the design heating rate upwards. Third, testing of SLA at relatively high heating rates and pressures revealed that complex material response behaviors, including melt flow, vaporization and sublimation, made it very difficult to understand the margins present, because earth testing can not exactly duplicate the Mars flight conditions. Once the SLA material was pushed up into a thermal region for which we could not model the material response with confidence, our knowledge of the margins we would hold in flight was undercut. No testing in arc jets facilities here on Earth can exactly duplicate the conditions of entry on Mars. It is confidence in the TPS material response to the range of possible at Mars conditions that serves as margin for flight. Once the SLA had been pushed up into a region where its material response was very complicated, we could no longer have confidence in our margins assessment.
Mission
The last blow to the use of SLA came in a set of tests in which the material seemed to vaporize very rapidly. This response was not predicted and although the conditions of the tests had some uncertainty to them, they were likely within the possible flight envelope, or at least not far from it. Under these circumstances, the project elected to make a very late change in the heat shield TPS material, choosing to go forward with Phenolic Impregnated Carbon Ablator (PICA), a much more simple material system, that had been shown to handle much higher heating conditions. This new material, PICA, was at the time the leading candidate for use on the Orion heat shield for return missions from the International Space Station. Further, this material had been used on the Stardust mission, which had experienced very high heating rates on Earth return.
The cost of PICA came in development delay, dollars, and mass. PICA is a great high heating rate ablator, but the density is higher than SLA and the thermal conductivity is also greater. In our application, PICA was a very mass inefficient choice. At our low heating rates, by PICA standards, our TPS would be sized by thermal conductivity considerations and the resulting heat shield would have over 100 kg of additional mass.
Thanks to the efforts and professionalism of the folks at Fiber Materials Incorporated (FMI), NASA Ames Research Center, Lockheed Martin Space Systems, the aeroshell provider and integrator of the TPS material, and the staff at JPL, the heat shield with new TPS tested and installed was ready for the 2009 launch.
In hindsight, the as flown heating rates and aero thermal environment as detailed in [Edquist paper] indicated that SLA may have been able to be used for the MSL flight. At the very least, a reduction in the required thickness of the PICA or SLA TPS materials may be achievable with the as flown conditions, if there were to be a re-flight of a similar design in the future.
BRIDLE, UMBILICAL AND DESCENT RATE LIMITER (BUD) DEVELOPMENT
At the heart of the sky crane maneuver is a winch-like system that is used to lower the rover below the decent stage. The BUD subsystem consists of an electromagnetic brake connected to a tapered spool, three nylon suspension bridles, a confluence point pulley, an umbilical deployment device and three rover mounted bridle exit guides. An electrical umbilical is used to connect the electronics on the descent sage to the electronics on the rover. The deployment of the electrical umbilical was performed using an Umbilical Deployment Device (UDD). The UDD also contains a retraction spring device with a leash to the umbilical. The retraction device is used to maintain tension on the umbilical during the touchdown even to prevent slacking and recontact with the top deck. After the umbilical is severed, the retraction spring also pulls the umbilical up and away from the rover, again to avoid recontact with the rover. There was an extensive test program to develop and demonstrate the reliability of all of the BUD devices. Early testing focused on cable management during the deployment as well as loads characterization. As hardware matured the test programed evolved into characterization of descent speed, elastic modes and post cable cut cable dynamics. A highly detailed analytical model of the descent rate limiter and suspension cables was generated. This model was used for all of the subsystem and system level simulations of the sky crane maneuver.
Preflight statistical analysis predicted a mean descent time of 5.3 seconds. Telemetry from the mission indicates that the complete deployment took 5.1 seconds, indicating that the descent brake performed exceptionally well. The imagery of the top deck of the rover after landing shows nominal configuration of the BEGs indicating that they operated as expected. 
MOBILITY DEPLOYMENT
Due to volume constraints inside the aero shell the rover's mobility system was required to be stowed during launch and EDL, but needed to be fully deployed prior to touchdown. Unlike any other rover mission the MSL sky crane landing system used the rover's mobility system as the landing gear. The design loads for the mobility system components were driven by a combination of touchdown loads as well as surface operations loads. In a few cases some components had deployment loads as their driving load case. In order to maximize reliability and minimize complexity, the rover mobility is passively deployed and does not make use of any rate limiters or shock absorbers. This brute force approach results in a more challenging analysis and verification effort but pays off in reliability.
The decision to deploy mobility during rover descent on the BUD was made early in the project when the timeline and fuel margins were exceptionally tight. As the project matured the statistical timeline margins relaxed a little, but never enough to warrant the added risk of moving mobility deployment to take place after BUD descent was complete. As it turns out, the as-flown mission profile had ample time to stage these activities sequentially but there was no way to take advantage of this in real time.
The mobility deployment V&V program was focused on verifying hardware functionality from the component level all the way up to the system level, and on verifying the math models used in all of the sky crane and touchdown simulations. Component tests generated performance data that was fed into the master ADAMS simulation. Multiple deployments of the mobility system were done under controlled ambient conditions as well as under simulated Mars ambient conditions. The highest level of fidelity test was called the Full Motion Drop Test (FMDT). The FMDT used a high fidelity descent stage and BUD subsystem along with a very high fidelity rover model. Both the rover and BUD hardware were essentially identical to the as flown hardware. The FMDT was a full-scale separation and mobility deployment of a rover from a descent stage using a BUD subsystem to control the descent. The test included every pyrotechnic event and deployment performed during the sky crane maneuver including all of the mobility deployments. To compensate for Earth gravity, the rover mass was reduced to approximate its Mars weight so that the BUD descent profile was as flight like as possible. The difference in gravity did affect some of the timing and accelerations in the test but did not jeopardize any of the hardware. 
RCS THRUSTER CONFIGURATION
During Entry, the RCS thrusters are used to bank the vehicle (coordinated roll and yaw) to steer the lift vector and influence the vehicle's flight through the atmosphere. The RCS thrusters are attached to the descent stage structure and protrude through initially cowls and later, after a design, ports on
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The design response to this was to reassess our RCS thruster configuration and pointing directions and ultimately make a change to the design. This was relatively painful since the resulting design change required re-routing of propulsion fuel lines and changes to the primary structure to support the updated configuration. The design fix was agreed upon by the project because of the importance of clean high margins in domains for which testing is very difficult or impossible. The reorientation of the RCS thrusters resulted in improved torque margins against the possibility of torque reversals. This analysis technique was shared with the Phoenix (PHX) project, and analysis of the PHX aero-RSC interaction showed that thrust reversals about the yaw axis were possible. The PHX project chose to not use the RCS system during entry, as had been the plan. During flight no aero-RCS interaction were detected, suggesting that the interactions, if present, were very small.
PARACHUTE TESTING
Parachute testing focused on strength verification and mortar deployment verification. A series of full-scale deployment tests were performed at the National Full Scale Aerodynamics Complex (NFAC). Ultimately, 10 load cycles starting with a 25% overload of the peak expected load and gradually dropping to approximately 10% overload were performed. The load cycles tests were performed to demonstrate canopy robustness to load oscillations seen while flying at Mach numbers greater than 1.5. The mortar deployment tests were aimed at demonstrating the adequacy of the parachute pack and deployment bag, and to verify the ballistics of the mortar itself. Telemetry from the mission indicates that the parachute performed as expected. It deployed at Mach 1.7 and produced descent rates and system dynamics within 10 % of preflight predictions.
SYSTEM DESIGN MARGINS
Surviving development challenges and disruptions requires having the margin to spend in recovering from those problems. This margin is commonly discussed when it comes to cost and schedule, but less frequently treated within a design context. Building the system design with technical margins within it is what allows the design to survive the errors in design, oversights in design requirements and failure in implementation. A measure of how effectively a system's design was margined is the extent to which the fundamental design architecture survives the development process unperturbed.
In the system design for the MSL EDL system, a JPL heritage, "overlapping requirements" approach was used. That is, requirements were partitioned at a system level, such that subsystems had overlap in the performance requirements. This is a method of transparently holding system technical margin in such a way that the underlying technical risks can be understood. Within each subsystem, the risks of meeting requirements can frequently be known, and the consequence of not receiving the interface requirement similarly understood. Naturally, for subsystem-to-subsystem technical margins, there is no general way of trading them against each other; they must be treated on a case-by-case, risk-by-risk basis.
For example, consider the powered descent vehicle separation from the parachute and backshell (BS Sep). Successful separation requires that the angular rates at the time just prior to the separation are within some given limit and that within that limit, the mechanical separation of the hardware will be successful.
During the flight of the MER Spirit rover, the team had been surprised by the amount of angular motion of the rover system under the parachute. As the early development of MSL began, the team wanted to protect itself against the possibility that we could be surprised by angular rates (we call them wrist mode rates) in flight again. To combat that threat, and keep the MSL radar viewing the ground at acceptable angular rates and off-nadir viewing angles, the descent stage reaction control system (RCS) thrusters had been configured to allow use of the RCS thrusters while the vehicle was under the parachute. Preliminary computational fluid dynamics simulation had shown that the thrusters plume would not be a concern to the parachute.
The guidance navigation of control subsystem (GNC) was given a requirement to damp the on-chute angular rates to less than 30 deg/sec about the transverse axes and less than 10 deg/sec about the axis of symmetry. This was well within the radar performance envelope of 90 deg/sec and would ensure best possible radar performance. If the mechanical subsystem (Mech) had been given the same requirement, there would have been no wasted effort and no requirements overlap. There would also be no robustness to errors made in design, our understanding of the flight risks, or implementation.
In the EDL system design, the requirements placed on the mechanical subsystem were to successfully separate at up 50 deg/sec about any transverse axis and 20 deg/sec about the symmetry axis. This required that mechanical build stronger guide rails to control that separation than would have been required otherwise. This could be seen as a mass hit, but in the development of a new system, caution and conservatism, are, most frequently, your friends.
During development, mechanical requested a reduction of their requirements to 50deg/sec about any axis. This request was made because the accommodation of the original requirement was leading to wide spread backshell structural design accommodations rather that local design reinforcements. In the face of a wide spread mass consumptive design response to what was truly an engineering judgment based design overlap requirement, the request for requirements relaxation was accepted at the system level.
Four years later in 2010, further CFD solutions of the RCS thruster plume jets had brought up the concern that hot gases, possibly hot enough to decompose Technora, might impinge on the Technora parachute suspension lines. Unfortunately, there were no tests that could be performed to help uncover whether this concern was truly warranted or not. With such an unanswered concern, the team began to consider if the on-chute RCS damping of the angular rates was the correct risk balance.
Further, in the intervening years, work at understanding the wrist mode angular motion on the parachute had progressed and the final models suggested that the maximum angular rates would be just about 50deg/sec, 3-sigma. Although the final modeled wrist mode rate was acceptable from a mechanical separation standpoint and the mechanical components all had healthy margins at this level without the use of the RCS system, the memory of being surprised during MER-A dynamics was still in the team's mind and there was skepticism as to how far the parachute system dynamics model could be trusted.
Balancing the risk across all the various considerations, the final selection of GNC rate dead-bands was set at 50 deg/sec, to inhibit RCS use unless the parachute dynamic modeling was very wrong and we were presented with another dynamics surprise during flight.
PRELIMINARY FLIGHT PERFORMANCE
The performance of the EDL system in flight was largely within the expectation of preflight predictions. Table 2 shows the as flown values for many of the quantities of interest. There were two notable anomalies during the landing night sequence of events. First the x-band radio, which was telemetering semaphore tones directly to Earth, turned itself to stand-by mode approximately seven seconds prior to the expected loss of signal due to Earth setting. During landing night, this was assumed to be a misinterpretation of the timing of flight telemetry. Upon closer inspection of the data, it is clear that the radio set itself to stand-by mode, for an as of yet undetermined reason. This is a subject of active investigation.
The second anomaly was the unexpectedly low touchdown velocity. This arose, in the lead author's opinion, from a combination of errors in judgment during the design phase of the mission. Because of issues with the near field stay out regions of the Ka-band Radar, the six-beam antennae lay out was forced to change. During this change, it was decided that only two beams dedicated to operation during the sky crane maneuver would be sufficient. This use of only two beams meant that third direction of the velocity vector would have to be estimated using the IMU and the assumption of a well-known local surface gravity. Preflight trajectory simulation analysis used the J3 gravity model for Mars and the onboard navigation filter utilized the J2 gravity model. 7 These are reduced from the 85 x 85 spherical harmonic gravity model available. In fact, there is a notable difference between the gravity models due to the topography at the Gale Crater landing site (not surprising considering that some large impact formed the crater).
On landing night, the error in the gravity model that had been used to construct the navigation filter z-axis velocity propagation resulted in an acceleration upward and along the spacecraft x-axis of a magnitude of approximately 450 µg's. 8 This resulted in the vertical motion of the descent stage and rover slowing as they approached the surface, while simultaneously picking up horizontal velocity. At touchdown, the vertical velocity of 0.6 m/s was well outside any prediction made during the development and analysis process (0.75 m/s +/-0.1 m/s, 3σ). The lower than planned vertical velocity resulted in reduced touchdown loads on the spacecraft; the increased horizontal velocity was still within the anticipated range.
The root cause of this anomaly can be traced back to a design error in laying out the beams of the radar. By devoting only two beams to the landing measurement, the system had to rely on a priori knowledge of the environment (in this case, local gravity). This reliance on detailed prior knowledge of the environment is antithetical to the design principals used in the formulation of the MSL EDL architecture. This was acknowledged at the time this design choice was made but it was believed that we understood the local gravity well enough to rely on an Earth based model and estimation, rather than direct measurement of the critical quantity of interest, in this case, the third component of the descent stage's ground relative velocity.
There is some poetry in the fate of the landing. That this was really the prime lapse, acknowledged at the time, in the team's design practice and that it would come to pass that the resulting system vulnerability exposed us to risk that was realized during flight, is a great lesson for future expeditions into the unknown of spaceflight engineering. The resulting touchdown velocity error would have been very likely survivable even if the sense of the error had been reversed (that is higher touchdown velocity of approximately 0.9 m/s). Such a landing, however, would have been survived on the margins carried within the mechanical design of the rover; that was certainly not the design intent.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The object of this paper was to explore some of those development challenges and to give the reader insight into what was entailed in the development process for MSL. The discussion must be understood to be incomplete. Space limitations require that we omit many important development struggles such as, the challenges of developing a descent radar, the concerns over blowing sand and dust and the possibility for spoofing the radar measurements, ground-plume interaction physics and the challenge of correctly understanding the phenomena, the challenge of testing of the radar using helicopters, towers and fighter jets, struggles with the thermal characterization of the MLE plumes and there effect n the rover, causing MLE nozzle redesign, etc. The development of the MSL EDL system represents a rich opportunity to understand what steps can be taken to set a system design up to survive the development challenges, and the kind of challenges that may present themselves.
Though the development of the MSL EDL system resulted in an EDL system that performed a very successful landing, it must be appreciated that luck played no small part in the success of the development and flight performance. As the rover grew in mass through the development process, from its initial estimate of 500kg to its final value of 900kg, the EDL system survived. It survived however, because the landing site altitude requirement could be softened. Near the beginning of the development process for the EDL system as designed today, the rover was 500kg and we were required to land at up to 2.0 km MOLA and by the time that the rover was at 900kg, our performance was closure to -1.0 km MOLA. It was the fact that science was interested in water, and water flows downhill, so to speak, that meant the sites of interest were low enough that the reduced landing altitude performance did not jeopardized the EDL design.
Good engineering judgment and a healthy appreciation for the challenges that await a spaceflight system development are always needed. There are steps to be taken to maximize the probability that a system design or architecture will survive the development process, but, in the end, a large measure of luck will likely be needed.
